Housing Energy Efficiency: Italy Lags Behind EU with 2.6% That Surprises and Highlights the Limits of Interventions Made
Eurostat has published a figure that weighs heavily in the debate on Italian building policies: in 2025, only 2.6% of the population in Italy lived in a home where energy efficiency had improved in the last five years, the lowest value in the European Union. In the same survey, the EU average stands at 23.9%, while countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, France, and Slovenia rank at the top.
The number is striking due to the apparent contrast with the recent experience marked by a strong reliance on the Superbonus and a visibly active season of renovations in the media. However, the Eurostat data measures a perception reported by families in the EU-SILC survey and not the overall volume of construction sites or the absolute number of interventions: it is therefore possible that a significant portion of the work, while completed, does not emerge proportionally in the indicator or is concentrated in periods not fully reflected by the survey.
The reading of the data is complemented by the assessment of the European Court of Auditors, which in the special report 20/2026 defined the Superbonus as the most expensive and least efficient measure among those examined for the energy rehabilitation of private housing financed with RRF funds. According to the audit, in Italy, the cost to save 1 kWh was about 10 euros, compared to much lower levels observed in other analyzed countries, and a significant share of interventions prioritized easy and quick jobs over deep renovations.
The central issue, therefore, does not only concern how many jobs have been done, but what type of jobs have produced measurable and lasting improvements. The Court also points out that monitored objectives often focused on outputs like the number of renovated homes or the surface area involved, rather than actual reductions in consumption, while energy performance certificates were deemed unreliable as a comparative basis.
From this arises perplexity about the fact that only 2.6% reported improvements in efficiency over the last five years, in light of the clamor generated by the 110%. The most plausible hypothesis is that the Eurostat data captures a partial effect: the survey is based on responses from families, completed works by 2023 may not be evenly distributed across the territory, and some interventions may have had more impact on tax bonuses rather than on the perception of a significant leap in the energy performance of housing.
The Eurostat documentation also clarifies that the indicator includes interventions such as thermal insulation, replacement of fixtures, and more efficient systems, which should leave a tangible mark on the quality of the dwelling. However, if the works are fragmented, focused on individual elements, and not part of a deep renovation, the perceived result may remain weak even in the face of significant public spending.
The overall picture is therefore dual: on one side, a negative record for Italy in the Eurostat ranking; on the other, a rejection by the European Court of Auditors regarding the relationship between resources used and results obtained. The message that emerges is clear: without structural interventions, serious monitoring, and more rigorous effectiveness criteria, spending on rehabilitation risks producing more construction sites than actual energy savings.